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1. Introduction 
Brexit will overshadow the development of fisheries legislation for the next decade.  The UK 
Government had developed no plan2 in the event of a “leave” vote for June’s advisory referendum 
and the months since the vote have been mired in politics and process as the Government and 
political parties attempt to formulate a strategy both within the UK and externally. The politics is 
beyond the scope of this article, but the legal process is of fundamental importance and will set the 
parameters for any political settlement. Nothing exemplifies this better than the case of R (ex parte 
Miller and another) v Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union.3 The Government had 
planned on using prerogative powers to trigger article 50 of the Treaty of Lisbon in order to start the 
process of negotiating withdrawal from the EU, but the Supreme Court ruled that the prerogative 
does not extend to acts that result in a change to domestic UK law and that there was no statutory 
authority to trigger article 50, so enabling legislation will be required.4 At the same time, the Court 
acknowledged that arrangements for consultations between the devolved institutions and the UK 
institutions were of a political character and therefore the Scottish Parliament will not have a legal 
right to be consulted on future changes to the legal framework in the UK, let alone a veto on the 
UK’s withdrawal from the EU.5 As we roll into the 'Great Repeal Bill' process, this delicate dance 
between the executive, the courts, Parliament and the devolved administrations is likely to be a 
constant.  
Although a small industry,6 fisheries have been iconic in the political narrative leading up to the 
European referendum, but as fisheries policy is currently the exclusive competence of the EU, the 
legal detail will have broader resonance than simply concerning the fishing sector.  This article aims 
to reflect upon the key issues that may arise in the renegotiation of the legal and policy framework 
for fisheries management in the UK.  It will explore the international position of fisheries law, before 
turning to key areas of Brexit negotiations including: the effects of devolution, how to replace the 
core mechanisms of the Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) and the effects on EU environmental law. 
One further aspect investigated is the impact of these negotiations on pledges in the SNP manifesto 
to reform inshore fisheries regulation in Scotland.7  Whilst this latter point is an area that has to a 
broad extent been more sheltered from EU decision-making, it is possible that wider reform of UK 
fisheries law will have ramifications for the inshore sector.  
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2. UK Fisheries Regulation in the Context of International Law 
As a matter of international law, the UK is a coastal state with sovereignty over all issues within its 
12 nautical mile territorial sea8 and additional sovereign rights over all living and non-living resources 
within 200 nautical miles of its coastline, an area known as the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ).9  
Indeed, the UK has one of the largest EEZs in the EU. However, because of its membership of the EEC 
and later EU, fisheries management within this area has been a matter for the European institutions 
in Brussels.10 Brexit will change this, with significantly implications for fisheries regulation in the UK 
and beyond.   The UK will, for the first time,11 have exclusive control of fisheries within its EEZ.  
However, it does not follow that the UK will be free from all obligations, as international law will 
provide some constraint on what the UK can do with its sovereign rights. It is therefore important to 
understand these limits before discussing the more detailed development of post-Brexit fisheries 
law and policy. 
The EEZ regimes grants coastal states a significant degree of control over their adjacent waters, but 
it also recognizes that other states have a residual interest in the resources therein.  Thus, coastal 
states are obliged to ‘promote the objective of optimum utilization of the living resources in the 
[EEZ]’, 12 which means that they must allow foreign fishing vessels to access any resources that 
cannot be harvested by the coastal state’s own fishing fleet.  A coastal state has some leeway in 
determining the size of the surplus that may be offered to foreign fishing vessels and the precise 
terms of access will also have to be negotiated.13 Determining those conditions will be a key issue in 
trying to disentangle the UK from the CFP, but it means that we may see European fishing boats in 
UK waters, even after Brexit. At the same time, UK vessels may also wish to retain access to fishing 
grounds in the waters of other European countries and some sort of a quid pro quo could be an 
outcome of negotiations on this issue.14 
There will also be other constraints in developing a post-Brexit fisheries regime.  International law 
imposes a duty on all states to ensure that living resources under their jurisdiction are managed in 
order to prevent overexploitation.15 To this end, the coastal state must adopt ‘measures that are 
designed to maintain or restore populations of harvested species at levels which can produce 
maximum sustainable yield, as qualified by relevant environmental and economic factors.’16 The 
coastal state is also under an overarching obligation to ‘protect and preserve the marine 
environment.’17  In particular, the coastal state must take into account key principles of international 
environmental law, such as the precautionary approach and the ecosystems approach – both of 
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which were previously applicable through the relevant EU Regulations18 and will now continue to 
apply by virtue of international law.19 These principles should guide future UK fisheries law and 
policy, although they still leave a degree of leeway as to how fisheries should be regulated and the 
substantive measures that are applied.   
Where fish stocks cross international boundaries, which is the case for many species in UK waters, 
there is an obligation to cooperate in order to ensure the long-term sustainability of fish stocks.20 It 
follows that the UK will have to continue working with neighbouring maritime states and the EU in 
order to achieve this objective. The UK will also have to interact with the North-East Atlantic 
Fisheries Commission (NEAFC), the relevant regional fisheries body with responsibility for fisheries 
management in areas beyond national jurisdiction, in order to ensure that any management 
measures applicable to straddling or highly migratory stocks are compatible with other international 
measures.21 NEAFC is not able to adopt fisheries measures that are applicable to coastal state waters 
without the consent of the coastal state concerned22 and current practice is that fishing allocations 
are agreed between coastal states before the matter is taken up by NEAFC in order to determine 
rules relating to the exploitation of high seas portions of fish stocks in the North-East Atlantic. 
However, there are proposals to amalgamate these two steps of decision-making into a single 
process in which all relevant states meet simultaneously to determine allocations within and beyond 
areas of national jurisdiction.23 Such an arrangement would not affect the sovereign rights of the UK, 
but it would potentially alter the political dynamics of fisheries negotiations and it is difficult to 
predict what impact this would have for the UK outwith the EU. 
The nature of these international rules means that the international legal framework still leaves a 
large degree of flexibility for the UK to adopt policies and regulations that are adapted to its own 
particular needs and requirements to a much greater extent than was possible under the CFP. As a 
result, the UK faces some important choices about how it chooses to structure its fisheries 
legislation and what goals it seeks to pursue in its negotiations with other states.  
 
3. Scottish Devolution and Fisheries Competence  
A further contextual question that arises for the UK is whether fisheries law and policy should be 
uniform across UK waters or whether there should be variance within the devolved regions. This is a 
question that holds particular importance for Scotland, which in practice controls 60% of UK waters 
and landings in Scottish ports of main species were valued £469,214 million in 2014 against landings 
for the rest of the UK totalling £219,712 million; this amounted to 69% of the total landings.24 The 
Scottish National Party have thus always argued that it is perverse that Scotland does not have a 
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direct say in fisheries negotiations at the EU level since it is by far the largest fishing nation within 
the UK.  
The division of fisheries competence at present is complex, involving the EU, the UK and the 
devolved administrations. Fisheries management to the 200 nautical mile limit is a devolved 
matter.25 In reality many controls emanate from the EU and the powers of the Scottish Parliament 
and Government in relation to fisheries have been constrained by applicable EU rules.26 Moreover, 
to avoid widely differing approaches being adopted by each of the UK’s administrations, a fisheries 
concordat27 has been agreed which establishes common practice by each administration for vessel 
licensing and quota distribution. This has limited the scope for the Scottish administration to adopt 
its own measures in relation to the Scottish fisheries zone. 
An important caveat to the dominance of EU decision-making applies to inshore waters. Under the 
1964 London Fisheries Convention (which predates the EU) the 6-12 nautical mile limit has shared 
access with some specific EU member states.28 This has limited the full effects of the CFP in this 
zone.  Within the 6 nautical mile limit, the situation is different again and the UK has exclusive access 
to its waters.29 More importantly for present purposes, Scotland has exercised direct control of the 
fishery within its 0-6 nautical mile limit by virtue of the powers granted under the Sea Fisheries 
(Shellfish) Act 196730 and the Inshore Fisheries (Scotland) Act 1984.  
This then leaves the question as to which institution should have responsibility for regulating 
fisheries in the EEZ in order to fill the void that will be left by exit from the CFP. Two different 
approaches could be taken to this question. Firstly, the Scottish Parliament could retain their current 
responsibility for fishing up to 200 nautical miles in the Scottish Zone,  but with wider executive 
powers automatically falling to the Scottish Ministers and a broadening of the concordat with other 
UK institutions to encompass a wider suite of effective regulations. This is the position advocated by 
the Scottish Government, which has unequivocally stated its view that “Powers to be ‘repatriated’ 
from Brussels that are already within the current responsibilities of the Scottish Parliament, such as 
agriculture and fisheries, must remain fully devolved, with decisions on any UK-wide frameworks 
being for agreement between the UK Government and the Devolved Administrations.”31  
Nevertheless, it remains a possibility that the UK Parliament could “retake” control over fisheries 
policy in the Scottish zone beyond 12 nautical miles, with certain executive functions then 
transferred to the Scottish Ministers.  This latter model would mirror the approach taken in relation 
to marine spatial planning where the Scottish Parliament has adopted the framework for planning in 
the territorial sea adjacent to Scotland32, whereas Scottish offshore waters are subject to the UK 
legislation.33  One argument is favour of this approach is that the UK is formally responsible for 
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ensuring compliance with international obligations that apply to the EEZ. It could be argued though 
that the Scotland Act already allows some control over the actions of the Scottish Parliament in this 
respect34 and therefore such a precaution is not necessary.   
Given its distinct characteristics, separate questions arise in relation to inshore fisheries. In practice 
the inshore and offshore fisheries can sensibly be managed separately, since the inshore fishery has 
more local connection and it has been managed separately to date. The preference for a tailored 
approach is confirmed by the Scottish Inshore Fisheries Strategy, as well as the National Marine Plan 
for Scotland, which emphasises the importance of moving decision-making closer to the people 
affected by those decisions.35 All the same, the question of the extent of inshore waters may have to 
be addressed.  Currently, the Inshore Fishing (Scotland) Act 1984 gives the Scottish Ministers the 
power to regulate sea fishing within ‘Scottish Inshore Waters’,36 which is defined as ‘the area 
adjacent to the coast of Scotland and within the Scottish zone, and to the landward of a limit of six 
miles from the baseline from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured, up to the mean 
high-water mark of ordinary spring tides.’37 This spatial limitation is largely designed to ensure that 
inshore fisheries regulation fits with existing arrangements under the CFP and London Convention.  
Yet, the London Convention can be “denounced”38 on two years’ notice.39 The UK Government may 
serve this notice co-terminus with its notice under Article 50. If that is the case, the Scottish 
Government would need to plan for its inshore fisheries potentially to extend to 12 nautical miles.  
The question of how to deal with inshore fisheries will be returned to in the conclusion, once we 
have considered further ramifications of Brexit for fisheries policy.  
 
4. Principles and Policy Objectives underpinning Fisheries Regulation 
The CFP has been the major driving force for fisheries regulation in the UK for the past four decades. 
The CFP has evolved over time to reflect emerging values.  Currently article 2 of the Basic Regulation 
contains a range of compulsory policy objectives including requirements for sustainability and 
maintaining rural livelihoods.40  Table 1 sets out the number of policy objectives relating to each key 
area. 
Table 1: Numbers of policies contained in Article 2 
Environmental Economic Social Employment 
6 6 4 2 
 
Even though some controls41 have been delegated to member states within 12 nautical miles, it is 
important to recognise that these basic objectives apply even to inshore waters.  If the UK leaves the 
EU, there will be a need to restate the policy objectives that guide fisheries regulation.  Some of the 
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current objectives (like environmental obligations) are likely to be implicit in the common law42 and 
intenational law43, but others (like the requirement for fisheries policy to contribute to a fair 
standard of living for those dependent on fishing) could potentially fall away, unless there is an 
active decision to retain them. This would give the UK and Scottish Government greater discretion in 
its treatment of the fishery – but at the same time may involve a subtle shift away from treating the 
resource as a mechanism for the delivery of social and regional policy.  
These policy objectives will in turn have serious relevance for the substantive fisheries regulations 
and measures that are applied to UK fisheries. The importance of these regulations and subsidies 
can only be understood on the basis that the right to fish is exceptionally broad.  The commercial 
industry operates fundamentally on the basis of the public right to fish,44 which grants a right to all 
British citizens to fish for anything they desire anywhere in UK waters, unless that right is in some 
way curtailed. The EU and UK measures have therefore had a key role in shaping the current 
industry, and changing any of them will have profound consequences, even for inshore waters.   
 
5. Quotas and  Technical measures 
Under the CFP, quotas have been decided between EU members and between the EU and adjacent 
coastal states.45 The quota is then distributed to member states for them to distribute in any way 
they see fit to their fishing businesses.46  Following Brexit, the UK will be responsible for setting a 
quota within its waters, but some form of settlement with neighbours, based on the concept of 
maximum sustainable yield, will still need to be established.47 There may be some stocks (such as 
shellfish) which are location specific and who’s lifecycle is wholly within a UK waters, but for many 
(such as mackerel and other pelagic species) the international regime will still apply.48 For other 
technical measures, withdrawal from the CFP could give Scottish authorities a freer hand to manage 
the fishery at the local level as they would not be bound by complex EU rules.  A practical example of 
this is the current ban on electric fishing.49 Scotland developed a nominally illegal razor fish industry 
from the 1990s onwards, carried out by divers catching live razor fish using a directed electric charge 
under water. On the face of it, this seems a relatively environmentally benign fishery, but the only 
way to test it (and ensure appropriate safety measures are in place) is to lobby the Scottish 
Government to liaise with the UK Government to persuade the EU institutions to negotiate a 
derogation: a long-winded process.  This has been achieved by the Dutch for use in their fleet of a 
controversial50 highly mechanised electric beam trawl51 but not so far for Scottish razor fishers.52 
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Changes to the potentially Byzantine process of legislating for EU technical measures could create a 
more agile management sytem reflective of local needs and realities – but ony if capacity is built up 
in Scottish fisheries management to take advantage of the greater flexibility.  It should also be 
remembered that some policies pilloried by members of the fishing industry,53 such as the 
requirement to land all catches (also known as the discard ban) originated in the UK,54 so shifting the 
locus of decision-making will not of itself lead to a consensus of industry friendly policies, if indeed 
such a thing is possible. 
 
6. Equal Access, Quota Allocation and the Real Economic Link 
Access to marine living resources in UK waters was a key argument underpinning the movement to 
leave the EU.  Fishermen’s leaders have been zealous of the prospects of gaining greater access to 
fishery resources in the UK’s EEZ.  The campaign group “Fishing for Leave” state that one of their 
four key aims is: 
“To ensure the UK regains and retains all fisheries resources and they are not not squander 
[sic] as negotiating capital in the extrication process – fishing was ‘expendable’ on accession 
and must not be on withdrawal.”55 
These are laudable objectives but whether they are achievable remains to be seen.  The historical 
context of fishing regulation needs a little further explanation in order to understand the challenges. 
The UK did not bargain away its EEZ fishing rights on entrance to the EU in 1973, since it only 
acquired rights after it joined the EEC; it first claimed a 200 nautical mile exclusive fisheries zone in 
1976.56  Indeed, the UK was already used to the concept of participatory arrangements and had 
agreed shared access (at its own instigation) between the 6–12 mile limit under the London Fisheries 
Convention in 1964. The UK did however agree to share access to its rights once acquired with other 
EEC members, rather than agree to a 50 nautical mile exclusion for British vessels as lobbied for by 
British fishermen at the time.57 The potential 50 nautical mile exclusion dwindled to a 12 nautical 
mile exclusion which itself is still subject to the London Convention. The UK is therefore not in a 
position to ‘regain’ rights, but rather when it leaves the EU it is in a position to gain exclusive control 
of fisheries in its EEZ for the first time.  This is important in terms of process, as it means that leaving 
the CFP will not be a simple case of reverting back to management practices established prior to UK 
entry to the EU, but will involve the development of something wholly new. 
Outside the 6 mile limit for some EU members, and the 12 nautical mile limit for all EU members, the 
UK EEZ (as with that of other member states) has been managed under the principle of equal 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
51
 EU Regulation 227/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 March 2013 amending Council 
Regulation (EC) No 850/98 for the conservation of fishery resources through technical measures for the 
protection of juveniles of marine organisms and Council Regulation (EC) No 1434/98 specifying conditions 
under which herring may be landed for industrial purposes other than direct human consumption art 1. 
52
 Scottish Government Consultation about electrofishing for razor clams in Scotland (2016) 
https://consult.scotland.gov.uk/marine-scotland/electrofishing-for-razor-clams/. 
53
 Fishing for Leave,The Results of the EU Common Fisheries (2017) http://ffl.org.uk/1782-2/. 
54
 Hugh’s Fish Fight The story (2017)  http://www.fishfight.net/story.html.  
55
 n 53 http://ffl.org.uk/objectives/. 
56
 See above. 
57
 BBC Fighting for fishing rights in Europe (19 July 1976) 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/july/19/newsid_2515000/2515155.stm. 
access.58  This is a reciprocal arrangement where the UK gives access to its waters in return for 
access to the waters of other member states.  In practice this has been an unequal for the UK. On 
average, for the years from 2012 to 2014, it is estimated that more than half (58%) of the fish and 
shellfish landed from the UK’s EEZ was caught by other EU members’ fishing boats. Other EU 
members’ boats landed 650,000 tonnes from UK waters, while UK boats landed 90,000 tonnes from 
theirs.59 
Other areas of the CFP are, however, benign to the fishing industry. There are two significant policies 
which afford the UK industry protection, which is not present in most sectors of the economy and 
which would fall away unless replaced in domestic legislation.  These are the requirement for an 
“economic link” for fishing businesses attracting UK quota, discussed below, and the European 
Marine and Fisheries Fund, discussed in the following section. 
The basic principles of freedom of establishment and freedom of movement have traditionally 
underpinned EU law, permitting businesses from other EU member states to set up in the UK.60 Yet, 
there is a central problem to the application of these principles in respect of fisheries.  Stocks 
allocated to the UK are distributed by the UK Government (and devolved administrations) to British 
fishing vessels.  In the famous Factortame case61, Spanish fishing interests successfully challenged 
the British Merchant Shipping Act 1988, inter alia, on the basis that it discriminated against EU 
member states since the definition had strict domicile and ownership requirements on owners of 
British fishing vessels.62 The UK Government was forced to amend the Act and remove these explicit 
limitations, resulting in the acquisition of British fishing vessels by businesses from elsewhere in the 
EU. The EU did however permit licence conditions on fishing vessels which required a “real economic 
link.”  The current licence conditions set out: 
The real economic link will be deemed to have been complied with, by the demonstration by 
the licence holder, to the satisfaction of UK fisheries departments, of a chosen option to 
include specifically:  
the landing of at least 50 per cent of the vessel's catch in the UK of stocks subject to 
EC quotas; 
employing a crew, of whom at least half are resident in a UK coastal area;  
incurring a certain level of expenditure on goods and services, provided in UK coastal 
areas.  
At least 75 per cent of the crew on board the vessel at any time shall be nationals of member
 states of the European Community or other British citizens.63 
A 2009 report by Vivid Economics found that 9% of UK fishing quota was held by foreign owned 
British vessels and they were responsible for 16% of landings by weight.64 It concluded that there 
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were additional mechanisms (particularly ending the free allocation of fishing quota to existing 
businesses) which could be implemented to restrict this figure. The House of Lords65 also concluded 
that the practice of “quota hopping” could be restricted under the existing economic link 
framework. So while the EU is criticized for unfair quota allocation,66 it should be recognised that 
there is still considerable discretion among the UK administrations relating to the process of quota 
allocation to the UK fleet. 
In theory Brexit may also provide an opportunity to revisit Factortame and reallocate domestic 
quota. The case of The UK Association of Fish Producer Organisations v Secretary of State for 
Environment, Food and Rural Affairs67 indicates that such an approach may breach the European 
Convention on Human Rights unless very carefully handled, but perhaps the reason that the UK has 
not tightened up the economic link criteria is that the UK has generally welcomed foreign 
investment in all of its industries, and creating ownership restrictions in fisheries would contradict 
that policy. 
For inshore waters in particular it is clear that the CFP is meant to protect domestic fishing 
businesses.68 Article 5(2) of the Basic Regualtion of the CFP explicitly states: 
In the waters up to 12 nautical miles from baselines under their sovereignty or jurisdiction, 
Member States shall be authorised, until 31 December 2022, to restrict fishing to fishing 
vessels that traditionally fish in those waters from ports on the adjacent coast, without 
prejudice to the arrangements for Union fishing vessels flying the flag of other Member 
States under existing neighbourhood relations between Member State. 
In practice it is difficult to see how effective these measures are until they are removed.  One 
salutary lesson is from the Scottish aquaculture industry (only recently included in the CFP) where 
the majority69 (up to two thirds according to some commentators) 70 of the industry is in Norwegian 
ownership.  
Moving away from these principles of EU law presents an opportunity for a greater allocation of the 
quota to the Scottish fleet, both from within the EU and potentially in negotiations with other third 
party states. However, as can be seen from the basis of relative stability, international negotiations 
on the access to “biological resources” do not necessarily result in an outcome settled by the 
fecundity of a member state’s waters.  The UK probably has a claim on paper to significantly larger 
allocation of international quota, but “that depends on what importance those negotiating Brexit on 
the UK’s behalf will attribute to the UK industry”.71  
 
6. Financial Support for Fisheries 
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Another key feature of European fisheries policy is the European Marine and Fisheries Fund (EMFF), 
which is designed to promote “competitive, environmentally sustainable, economically viable and 
socially responsible fisheries and aquaculture.”72 In doing so, the EMFF explicitly supports the 
implementation of the CFP.73 It is a gigantic fund worth €243 million to the sector,74 with around a 
half being spent in Scotland.75 The figure is a likely to be a significant under-estimation of the 
amount, since many EMFF programmes require matched funding, and therefore direct further 
finance into the sector. The programme is explicitly exempted from EU rules on state aid.76 The scale 
of the EMFF comes into greater focus when placed against the value of the entire UK fishery, around 
£1.1 billion.77 Industry has been strangely weak in  making its case for the preservation of the Fund.  
In his evidence to the House of Lords, Bertie Armstrong  of the Scottish Fishermen’s Federation (SFF) 
said:  
“It is being used in “Project Euro Fear”: Oh, my God, we are all going to die if we do not get 
the EMFF funding. That is so much nonsense. It is almost the jam doughnut question: If there 
is a jam doughnut and you are offering it to me, I would very much like it, but I am not 
depending on it for my survival.”78 
This is not the place to conduct a full investigation of the EMFF and its predecessors, but the EMFF in 
many cases is particularly useful in support of the smaller inshore operators and their regulation.79 If 
this subsidy is removed its impact is likely to be felt unevenly across the industry, and bold 
statements like Mr Armstrong’s should not be the final word on the effects on the individual 
businesses which make up the sector. 
 
7. Fisheries Trade post Brexit 
The uneven impact of regulation is particularly true in respect of free trade.  There is no doubt that 
fish products make up an important part of UK overseas trade. In 2014, the UK exported £1,008m of 
fish by value of a total catch worth £1,560m and imported £848m of total imports of £2,736m.80 If 
                                                          
72
 EU Regulation 508/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 art 5(a). 
73
 Ibid art 5(b). 
74
 Department for the Environment Food and Rural Affairs European Fisheries Fund to boost sustainable fishing 
in the UK (2015) https://www.gov.uk/government/news/european-fisheries-fund-to-boost-sustainable-fishing-
in-uk. 
75
 Marine Management Organisation European Maritime and Fisheries Fund (EMFF): UK Managing Authority 
(UKMA) (2016) https://www.gov.uk/guidance/european-maritime-and-fisheries-fund-emff-uk-managing-
authority-ukma. 
76
 n 72 art 8. 
77
 T Appleby Y van der Werf C Williams The management of the UK's public fishery: A large squatting claim? 
(University of the West of England, 2016)  http://eprints.uwe.ac.uk/28855. 
78
 House of Lords Revised transcript of evidence taken before the European Union Select Committee on the 
European Union (2016) 
http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/eu-energy-and-
environment-subcommittee/brexit-fisheries/oral/37841.html. 
79
 Indeed, maxmising support from the fund had been a major plank of the Scottish Inshore Fisheries Strategy; 
Marine Scotland (n 7) outcome 6. 
80
 House of Lords (n 65) written and oral evidence, at 38 https://www.parliament.uk/documents/lords-
committees/eu-energy-environment-subcommittee/Brexit-fisheries/Fisheries-evidence-volume-Written-
Oral.pdf. 
the UK leaves the European single market81 without securing some preferential trading 
arrangement, then the top five fishery exports would face tariffs under World Trade Organisations 
Rules of 2% (salmon) to 20% (frozen mackerel).82 This comes at a time when Canada is in the process 
of completing its free trade deal with the EU83 and could have zero tariffs on key fishery exports to 
the EU, many of which will compete with British exports.84  
The direct impacts on the commercial fishing sector are going to be unpredictable (at least for the 
purposes of this paper) and very sectoral. Once again the SFF is sanguine about these risks:   
“Markets are markets, and people have things to sell that other people want. Spanish 
fishermen do not buy Scottish langoustines because they think “There is a perfect market 
here and I will use that to buy my langoustines”. They want langoustines at a sensible price. 
We are sure, one way or another, that that can be organised.”85 
It is interesting to note that the immediate aftermath of the vote to leave and the subsequent fall in 
the pound must have been a huge boost to Scottish fishery exports to the EU. This perhaps 
exemplifies how difficult it is to accurately forecast the market. 
The UK Government has highlighted its view that there is a mutual interest in continued high levels 
of market access for agricultural and fisheries products.86 Yet, the arrangement to negotiate tariff-
free access is likely to turn out to be incredibly complex.87 The EU deal with Canada (CETA) has been 
treated as a ‘mixed agreement’ and thus still requires agreement the European Parliament for the 
trade parts to provide provisionally (since they are the sole competence of the EU) and agreement 
from the member states’ (and some regional) Parliaments before it is fully implemented.88  That has 
taken seven years for CETA and the timer is still running. The political imperative was not there in 
the same way as there will be with the UK, but the UK process will be an order of magnitude more 
complicated and potentially acrimonious.89 Fisheries may have a politically disproportionate 
significance on both sides; they featured heavily in the UK media in the run up to the vote in June 
2016, but also if the UK is seeking a mixed agreement with the EU the opinion Flemish Parliament 
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may become important – since the Belgian fleet would lose could lose access to UK waters it has 
long fished.90 
In the run up to the referendum the UK Government stated that the process would likely take a 
decade or more; the lengthy EU and member state processes involved mean that prospect remains 
unchanged.91 It is encouraging, however, to note however that the free trade element could be 
settled more expeditiously than some of the other aspects of UK withdrawal.  
Tariffs are not necessarily the only trade-releated issue that will arise in renegotiating the 
relationship between the UK and the EU. The process of clearing customs with foreign states can be 
problematic, particularly with fresh produce.  Moreover, to export UK produced food to the EU it is 
likely that of EU food safety law will still need to apply.92 This bring with it two problems: the UK will 
no longer have any influence on the process of drafting EU food safety regulations and it will lose 
access to the European Court of Justice in the event that the EU or member states are developing 
food safety (or other) regulation which has the effect of being anti-competitive.93 Some of the issues 
could be addressed through a bilateral trade deal that included rules on equivalence of public health 
measures94 and some measures on international arbitration.95 Without such agreement, UK fish 
exports could face considerable bureaucracy, and this could end up more problematic than mere 
financial tariffs. 
 
8. Environmental Regulation 
This paper is not the place for a full exploration of the impacts of Brexit on environmental law,96 
which will depend very much on the type of ongoing relationship the UK has with the EU, but it 
seems increasingly likely that the UK will adopt a ‘hard Brexit’ approach, which would wholly 
repatriate environmental law from the European institutions.  It does not mean that the UK will 
simply be able to repeal its laws in this area, since many environmental obligations stem from 
international law, and in any case environmental protection has strong domestic political support in 
both the Westminster and Edinburgh Parliaments. However there will be significant changes to the 
modus operandi of UK environmental law. 
The commercial fishing industry has long claimed exemption from certain environmental laws.  The 
Environmental Impact Assessment Directive does not include fishing97 and the Habitats Directive has 
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not been fully applied to fishing outside the 6 mile limit.98  Part of the reason is that since fishing is 
the exclusive competence of the EU and environmental regulation is a shared competence, member 
states have found it difficult to implement environmental laws on the EU institutitons.99 There is 
therefore, an opportunity to normalise the commercial fishery within the current regulatory 
framework. 
It is possible that Brexit will have some negative effects on the legal framework for the protection of 
the environment. In particular, EU law offers scope for the European Commission to infract 
recalcitrant member states for failure to comply with environmental duties,100 a rare power that will 
be difficult to replicate outwith the EU institutions. It is likely that citizens will still be able to bring 
cases against the government for failure to take into account relevant environmental considerations 
in their decision-making,101 although access to a supranational court will no longer be available.102 
The loss of these important mechanisms could lead to greater politicisation of environmental 
regulation and a weakening of environmental standards unless the UK and Scottish institutions are 
sufficiently strengthened.  
Nevertheless, there is evidence of a commitment to ensure that UK fisheries are managed in a 
responsible manner. The UK Marine Policy Statement set out a vision for ‘clean, healthy, safe, 
productive and biologically diverse seas’103 and in Scotland, the National Marine Plan calls for, inter 
alia, ‘an ecosystem-based approach to the management of fishing which ensures sustainable and 
resilient fish stocks and avoid damage to fragile habitats’, ‘protection for vulnerable species’ and 
‘improved protection of the seabed.’104 Public authorities are required to have regard to this plan 
when issuing any approval, consent, licence or permit for an activity that may affect the relevant 
marine area.105 One key challenge for the future is how to integrate fishing interests into the 
development of regional marine plans, a topic that will require careful consideration in order to 
achieve an appropriate balance of interests.106  
Further evidence of the integration of environmental law and fisheries policy is provided by the use 
of powers under the Marine (Scotland) Act 2010 to regulate fishing activities within designated 
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Nature Conservation Marine Protected Areas.107 Scottish Ministers are under an obligation to create 
and maintain a network of such sites in the waters under their control108 and there will be pressure 
to make progress on these objectives resulting from the UK’s commitments under the Convention 
on Biological Diversity109 and the (OSPAR) Convention on the Protection of the Marine Environemnt 
in the North-East Atlantic110 and the need to report on what action has been taken to the 
international institutions that are responsible for overseeing these instruments. When it comes to 
fulfilling these objectives, Marine Scotland has recognised that a balance must be achieved between 
environmental protection and the use of marine resources and it has indicated that ‘the 
redistribution of anthropogenic impacts, such as fishing effort, that is likely to arise from proposed 
management will be considered’, in part through consultations with stakeholders.111  This highlights 
once again the need to embed fishing issues within broader marine planning processes and the 
importance of accessible and transparent decision-making procedures.112  
 
9. Conclusions 
Permeating the debate around Brexit has been a sense that the UK will ‘regain’ control of its fishery.  
If that were the case, the UK could simply be able to reinstate whatever management measures 
were in place before joining the EU and the process might be straightforward, but it is not. Given 
that the UK only gained control of its EEZ after it joined the EEC, it will need to develop a wholly new 
fisheries management structure in a context which is completely different to any fisheries 
management process it has undertaken to date.  Developments in fisheries and environmental law 
mean that there are international constraints which have been integrated into the EU processes and 
which the UK will somehow need to replicate in its new structures.  Moreover, devolution means 
that those structures will need to reflect local needs. There may be a UK fishery in the eyes of 
international law, but the concept is not particularly helpful in the context of devolution as it is 
currently legally constituted. 
Replacing the CFP raises a number of questions about the technical measures that should be put in 
place to manage access to fish stocks and the control of fishing effort.  It is clear that EU legislation is 
very unpopular with the fishing industry.113 However the very nature of the public right to fish, which 
grants a right to all British citizens to fish in all UK waters, using whatever gear they like, means that 
the nature of regulation will have a direct impact on livelihoods.  The centralised command and 
control model, with exclusive competence for the EU, has certainly been problematic; changing EU 
regulation requires having a voice in Brussels which has not always been possible for all fishermen.  
Furthermore the policies of relative stability and equal access which granted rights to other member 
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states to fish in UK waters were almost certainly a result of the UK surrendering fishing interests in 
favour of other diplomatic advantages. At the same time, it is also true that the UK could have done 
more in the management of its quota to reduce quota hopping and ensure that the quota was 
distributed to UK fishermen on a more equitable basis. Moreover, some regulations (such as the 
need for conservation and management measures for stocks whose lifecycle straddles national 
boundaries) emanate from international law and so will continue to apply regardless of EU 
membership. 
Some credence must be given to arguments put forward by industry that the imposition of tariff 
barriers will not be too harmful on markets.  However, it is impossible to ignore the potential 
disruption for UK fishing businesses not just of tariff barriers, but also of other regulatory hurdles 
and the continued operation of EU food safety laws. It will not be possible to leave the EU without 
surrendering rights for the UK to influence EU regulations. In that context uncertainty is likely to 
stalk the sector until there is greater clarity on the direction of travel. 
The process for establishing UK controls over fishing will be very complex. It is likely primary 
legislation will be needed, and given the requirements of international law for this sector in 
particular, those international laws should be firmly incorporated into the UK statutory framework. 
In practice, the process outlined by Mrs May of a “Great Repeal Bill”114 is nothing of the sort.115  A 
huge amount of new legislation will be required to translate EU law to UK law. Rather than repealing 
legislation, Westminster will, in reality, be creating a vast amount of new UK law. Legal academics 
have raised concerns that the Bill may require a huge delegation of power from Parliament to the 
Executive to make the appropriate changes.116  Not enough delegated authority and Ministers will 
not be able to enact the measures they need – too much and huge swathes of law could be 
rewritten under delegated authority and effectively buried in the pile of secondary legislation 
parliamentarians cannot hope to scrutinise. If this is the case, there is no knowing whether it will be 
any better than EU law which it seeks to replace.   
Alongside these challenges is the need to fit the new fisheries legal framework into the devolution 
settlement. Although legally straightforward, this latter point has serious political consequences. The 
Supreme Court held that devolved institutions did not have a veto over Brexit but the majority, 
nevertheless, highlighted that ‘the Sewel Convention has an important role in facilitating 
harmonious relationships between the UK Parliament and the devolved legislatures’,117 thus 
indicating that their judgment should not be seem as the end of the matter. Indeed, returning 
powers to Westminster, given the promises made to Scotland in the run up to the Scottish 
Independence referendum,118 is liklely to fuel calls for a second referendum and potentially Scottish 
independence. The UK and Scottish Parliaments and and their civil services would become truly 
stretched if they had to draft legislation to deal with both incredibly complex situations at once.119 
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Another important question is whether these changes should affect current plans to reform inshore 
fisheries governance. Undoubtedly, Brexit will have implications for this sector. Removal of the CFP 
will affect some fundamental fisheries policies and technical measures for inshore waters, but the 
need for inshore reform seems to be largely driven by a requirement for better inshore 
governance,120 as well as the need to integrate fisheries into the emerging system of marine spatial 
planning.121  These issues are already within the competence of the Scottish Government and there 
is therefore a strong argument that inshore reform within 6 nautical miles should be progressed in 
any event, independent of Brexit negotiations. Moreover, inshore reform before Brexit also presents 
an opportunity to debate at an early stage some of the legal issues which will affect offshore waters 
if the UK gains exclusive control of its EEZ, before the politics becomes too heated.  At the same 
time, it would be possible, in principle, to design a new inshore arrangement so that it could 
potentially be extended to the entire territorial sea of Scotland, should such an opportunity arise 
and be considered appropriate following the result of the Brexit negotiations.  
The situation relating to Brexit is inevitably fluid, which makes it difficult, if not impossible, to make 
concrete predictions or proposals at this stage.  With this in mind, this paper has sought to highlight 
some of the key legal issues that will arise in the context of fisheries, as well as some of the possible 
approaches that could be taken. Which course is ultimately set will depend upon a number of 
decisions that are made in the coming months and years. Some sense of the direction of travel will 
be discerned when (and if) Theresa May finally serves notice under article 50 of the Treaty of Lisbon.   
If she denounces the London Fisheries Convention at the same time, then major fisheries reform will 
certainly be on the agenda. 
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